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Abstract 
 
In Venezuela, exchange controls affect firm competitiveness, market structures and, 
potentially, markups’ size. Also, legal rigidities in the labor market and an active setting of 
minimum wages by the government could produce other markup innovations. These 
exogenous variations in markups could be the expression of distributional processes 
between firms, consumers and workers, and ultimately affect the business cycle. Based on 
different markup measures, we empirically identify how much of the markup variability in 
Venezuela is due to aggregate fluctuations (supply and demand shocks) and how much 
can be attributed to distributional processes (exogenous markup shocks). We find that 
while aggregate fluctuations tend to be more important, exogenous shocks explain a 
substantial part -about 40%- of the markup. These exogenous shocks mostly affect 
inflation and nominal wages, but not real activity. When aggregate fluctuations take place, 
the markup is mainly procyclical. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Venezuela is a relatively small economy that is exposed to large commodity 
price shocks. The distributional effects of these shocks are significant, although the 
transmission channels are not well understood. There is one additional element 
that adds complexity to this case: because most of the fiscal funding comes from 
oil revenues, the government has a substantial size and a considerable discretion 
for establishing exchange rate regimes. Given the large volatility of foreign 
currency flows, Venezuelan governments have frequently introduced exchange 
rate controls to hypothetically avoid capital outflows and domestic currency 
collapses. These controls have always been implemented as both price and 
quantity restrictions to trade and financial flows that explain the emergence of dual 
markets for the exchange rate. In fact, it is not surprising that exchange rate 
controls have been operational in Venezuela in different periods, to wit: 1983-1988, 
1994-1996 and 2003 to the present (2018). Interestingly, the long duration of the 
last control is difficult to rationalize, given the occurrence of two commodity price 
booms since 2004. 
In Venezuela, exchange controls typically aim at subsidizing foreign 
currency, and their administrative apparatus inevitably ends up discretionally 
picking the receivers of massive subventions. This process affects firm 
competitiveness, market structures and potentially, markups’ size. In other words, 
by deepening non-competitive goods markets, the exchange control creates 
propitious conditions for the emergence of markup innovations that are not 
necessarily driven by the business cycle. Also, legal rigidities in the labor market 
and an active setting of minimum wages by the government could produce other 
markup innovations that become the source of distributional processes between 
firms, consumers and workers. 
In most theoretical models, the markup is regarded as an endogenous 
variable that reflects the interaction between total factor productivity and costs, 
given that structural factors, such as the degree of price stickiness and the level of 
competition among firms, remain constant. Therefore, little attention has been paid 
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to the effects of markup variations that are not endogenously driven by the 
business cycle. In a relatively recent DSGE model, Smets and Wouters (2007) 
introduce the possibility that the markup is subject to exogenous innovations. 
Although these authors do not explain the source of such innovations, their 
empirical findings suggest that a great deal of the US inflation, in the short and 
medium run, can be explained by these markup shocks.  
In this paper, we empirically disentangle how much of the markup variability 
in Venezuela is due to aggregate fluctuations (supply and demand shocks) as 
opposed to how much can be attributed to distributional processes (exogenous 
markup shocks). In this way we can determine, how important exogenous markup 
shocks are, and, what the effects of these shocks are on the aggregate goods 
market. We are also able to determine the impact of aggregate supply and demand 
shocks on the markup and the rest of related variables.  
We find that while aggregate fluctuations are more important, distributional 
shocks account for about 40% of the markup. This implies that a subtancial part of 
the markup has its explanations in factors not associated with the business cycle 
dynamics. In this sense, the presumption that institutional factors explain the 
Venezuelan markup becomes relevant. However, these exogenous increases in 
the markup only affect positively a small fraction of the inflation rate, especially at a 
medium-term horizon. Overall, the markup also responds to aggregate supply and 
demand shocks procyclically. In both cases, the gains in productivity exceed the 
rise in unitary labor costs. 
 We estimate the markup using measures based on the labor input margin. 
Specifically, our benchmark estimate is based on the proportionality between the 
markup and the inverse of the labor share. Nonetheless, we also incorporate other 
elements that may affect markup calculations and that reflect the presence of other 
rigidities. For example, we implement markup measures that consider different 
possibilities: a production technology with elasticity of substitution smaller than 
one, the effect of technology shocks, variable utilization of capital, and overhead 
labor among others.  We combine both aggregated data with information obtained 
from household surveys. Specifically, we obtain measures of worked hours and 
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overhead labor from household surveys. We use data from national accounts to 
obtain a markup rate for the whole economy and for the manufacturing and trade 
industries. 
 Econometrically, we use a structural VAR (SVAR) to distinguish between 
aggregate shocks and exogenous markup shocks. Shocks are identified with a 
combination of sign restrictions and zero restrictions. The system uses information 
on the markup, productivity, the goods and labor market.  
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. One of these is the 
literature on markup and business cycles. A long discussion in the literature is 
whether the markup is procyclical (Domowitz, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1986; Haskel, 
Martin, & Small, 1995; Morrison, 1994) or countercyclical (Banerjee & Russell, 
2004; Bils & Chang, 2000; Bils & Kahn, 2000; Bils, Klenow, & Malin, 2013; 
Fedderke, Kularatne, & Mariotti, 2007; Gali, Gertler, & Lopez-Salido, 2007; 
Karabarbounis, 2014; Kryvtsov & Midrigan, 2013; Marchetti, 2002; Rotemberg & 
Woodford, 1999; Santaeulalia-Llopis & Koh, 2014). This discussion, although is 
recently inclining to the lack of cyclicality of the markup, has not been completely 
settled because markup estimates tend to be sensitive to the way theoretical 
assumptions are implemented. Nevertheless, the core of this discussion revolves 
around the question of what shocks actually drive the business cycles: 
technological or demand shocks. Depending on this answer, the markup would 
respond procyclically or countercyclically to output. For instance, if the economy is 
mainly driven by technological shocks, increasing factor productivity allows for 
higher markup rates while increasing output. On the other hand, an economy hit by 
demand shocks will raise its production only by facing higher marginal costs that 
most likely drive markup rates down. Our paper approximates the relationship 
between the markup and the business cycle from a different perspective by 
explicitly distinguishing the sources of business cycle fluctuations in supply and 
demand shocks. 
 Another highly discussed topic in the literature refers to the connection 
between inflation and the markup. One view is that when inflation increases, price 
dispersion also rises, leading to a reduction in the markup (Banerjee & Russell, 
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2001, 2005; Benabou, 1992; Jonsson & Palmqvist, 2006). This occurs because 
firms end up facing a flatter demand curve as a result of more intense search by 
consumers due to relatively smaller leather-shoe costs. There is the opposite view 
as well that rising inflation is positively related to less competitive markets that 
allow for higher markup rates (Noyola Vázquez, 1956). Also, increasing inflation 
can be associated with higher levels of uncertainty, which in turn results in a rising 
markup (Frenkel, 1979). Our paper contributes on this topic by empirically 
exploring the connection between markup and inflation and by allowing a direct 
effect of exogenous markup shocks on inflation. 
 The structure of the paper is the following: next, we provide a historical 
perspective on annual and quarterly markups for the total economy and most 
important sectors. Then, we explain the econometric strategy that allows us to 
analyze the behavior of the quarterly markup and other aggregate variables for 
fifteen years. In section IV, we present the results of the econometric model for the 
benchmark case -the Cobb-Douglas markup measure- and our interpretation 
regarding the conditions that trigger distributional markup shocks. In section V, we 
check the robustness of econometric results for other measures of the markup and 
labor productivity. We also check the response of markups for the manufacturing 
industry and trade sector to aggregate goods market shock. In the last section, we 
provide the final remarks. 
 
 
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MARKUP 
 
a. YEARLY DATA 
 
The markup (𝜇) is defined in the neoclassical theory as the ratio of price to 
marginal cost. When firms minimize costs, they make marginal costs equal across 
all possible margins. Traditionally, the computation of markup has focused on the 
labor margin. Under the assumption that the production function takes a similar 
form to a Cobb-Douglas production function, we can write markup as:  𝜇 = 𝛼 𝑠ℎ𝐿−1     ⇒      ?̇? = − 𝑠ℎ𝐿̇        (1) 
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where 𝑠ℎ𝐿 is the labor share and  𝛼 is the elasticity of output with respect to labor 
inputs. This is by far the most common empirical approximation to the markup rate.  
There is some confusion in the nontechnical literature about the meaning of 
the markup. The markup rate is sometimes confused with the profit rate. While the 
latter is related to the net profitability of an investment, the markup reflects a wedge 
between marginal revenues and marginal costs, which is directly associated with 
the structure of the market demand and firm production. This wedge varies for 
each additional unit produced, and it pays for fixed costs, opportunity costs, 
financial costs and even macroeconomic uncertainty (Frenkel, 1986). Therefore, 
the existence of an increasing markup does not necessarily reflect the existence of 
increasing profits, if the sum of fix costs faced by firms is also growing. 
Nonetheless, the fact that a markup rate has a positive tendency might indeed 
reveal that there are objective conditions that allow firms to hold increasing 
margins. 
Using Venezuelan national accounts annual data for the period 1968-2012, 
we compute the labor share as the ratio of compensations to employees over the 
nominal domestic value added. Then, we calculate how this ratio has changed over 
time by constructing an index for the markup. This index reflects the accumulated 
variations applied to the level of markup existing during the base year. Figure 1 
shows markup series for the total economy -for the period between 1968 and 
2012-, and for the private sector, the manufacturing industry (excluding the 
refinement of oil products), and trade industry -for the period running from 1968 to 
2007. Because disaggregated national accounts are not available beyond 2007, 
sectoral markups have a shorter length.2  
In figure 1, all markup measures show a growing tendency. However, this 
trend is significantly less pronounced for the total economy than for the other 
measures. This could occur for several reasons. First, the value added of the total 
economy includes many goods and services that are not actually valued at market 
 
2 The Central Bank of Venezuela, which is the producer of the national accounts, is in the process 
of updating the base year to 2007. 
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prices. Excluding oil production, around 17% of the value of all goods and services 
produced are provided by the public sector. The oil sector accounts for an 
additional 18% approximately of the GDP. Second, the nominal value of oil is 
highly volatile due to the significant swings in the international oil prices. This 
important volatility in oil prices is partially passed through the nominal GDP and, 
hence, through the labor share and the markup rate. For instance, the total 
economy markup rate, for 1997 and 2009, shows important troughs that are mostly 
explained by the significant slump in oil prices during those years. In those cases, 
the fall -or small increases- in the nominal GDP tended to raise the total labor 
share, and consequently reduce the markup. For these reasons, we also calculate 
the markup index for some sectors of the economy, i.e., the private sector, the 
manufacturing industry, and the trade and repair industry, which are also provided 
in Figure 1.3 
Figure 1. Markup indexes based on annual figures of the labor share 
 
 
3 There is another reason to focus on sectoral markup indexes. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) 
consider that a markup index for the whole economy is less satisfactory because it includes the 
government and income of the proprietors (mixed income), which contains an element of 
compensation as well.  
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Differently than the total economy markup, these three series present a 
pronounced upward trend during the whole-time span. Moreover, the private sector 
markup displays large temporary increases in 1983-1984, 1994-1996 and 2003. All 
these important surges take place during the initial implementation of exchange 
rate controls. Those spikes in the markup together with the growing trend during 
the rest of the exchange rate control years -1985 through 1988-, could hint at 
structural connections between exchange rate controls and markups. However, 
these hypotheses will be more carefully explained for the quarterly data, which 
cover the behavior of the markup for the last -and longest- exchange rate control.  
The markup for the manufacturing industry exhibits the fastest growth of all 
three series especially during the 1990s. A remarkable finding is that this large 
markup increase occurs in a context of generalized deindustrialization -as Vera 
(2009) describes. This implies that the rise of the markup is not likely to have 
occurred amid a process of increasing productivity. Therefore, the combination of a 
rising markup and a significant deindustrialization could hint instead at a 
reorganization in the manufacturing process, in which high-wages labor were 
mostly slashed. That is, the manufacturing industry likely specialized in activities 
that were more intensive in low-skilled, low-wage labor.4 The trade markup also 
shows a steady increasing tendency for the whole sample. 
In summary, the markup has increased over time, although it remains 
unclear the effects caused by the performance of labor productivity. It also remains 
open the discussion about the impact of minimum wage decrees on firms’ salaries 
and the role of employment protection regulations. With minimum wage decrees, 
an important part of the economy salary mass is set up unilaterally by the central 
government, potentially affecting the trajectory of real wages and markups. With a 
new employment protection regulation decree passed on 2002, any dismissal 
 
4 Some authors have argued that an excessive capital accumulation -especially during the 
exchange rate control in the eighties- allowed the manufacturing sector to become more capital 
intensive. This excessive capital accumulation would have raised labor productivity and therefore 
explain an increasing markup. Nonetheless, this last hypothesis might be at odds with many other 
interpretations that picture the nineties as a decade of falling productivity. 
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without cause is considered illegal.5 Therefore, the presence of several exchange 
controls and highly controlled labor markets characterize particular conditions for 
the Venezuelan economy that stress the importance of evaluating the occurrence 
of non-cyclical markup variations.  
 
b. RECENT QUARTERLY MARKUP BEHAVIOR 
 
 There are several ways of defining the markup growth rate, depending on 
the assumptions implemented for its calculation. For our benchmark case (the 
Cobb-Douglas measure), we define the variations in the markup as the negative 
variations in the labor share, which is defined by the difference between the growth 
of the nominal (non-oil) gross domestic output (nGDP) and the growth in the total 
salary mass (smass), i.e. the number of occupied in the economy times the 
nominal salary per worker. In particular, we measure this definition as: 
 ?̇? = −𝑠ℎ𝐿̇ ≝  𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃̇ − 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠̇ ≞ 𝑦?̇? − 𝑟?̇?     (2) 
  
where  𝑦?̇?  is the variation in the average productivity per worker (since for the 
Cobb-Douglas case the marginal product is proportional to the average product) 
and 𝑟?̇? is the variation in the real wage per worker, which is computed as the 
nominal variation in average wages adjusted by the non-oil GDP deflator.6,7  
 Although simple, this decomposition of the markup highlights the fact that 
growing markup rates can be obtained either by increasing the (marginal) 
 
5 In general terms, all permanent employees -except those that are public servants, temporal 
workers or domestic service workers-, with at least three-month tenure could not be dismissed 
without just cause. The exceptions for this decree are workers that exercise managerial functions, 
trusted employees and those who earned more than three times the minimum wage. 
6  We use the measure average productivity per worker instead of the average productivity per hour 
worked because of the lack of statistics measuring hourly salaries.  
7 The growth of the nominal salary per worker is obtained from a statistic published by the Central 
Bank called IRE (índice de remuneraciones de empleados), which basically reflects the behavior of 
salaries in the formal sector of the economy. Therefore, this measure excludes any kind of labor 
income perceived by the informal sector and also excludes for instance, the income that pensioned 
workers might receive through different government ministries. In this sense, the definition of salary 
implicit in this statistic does not necessarily match the definition of labor compensation in national 
accounts.    
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productivity of workers or by reducing the speed of real salary growth in the 
economy. At the light of the academic discussion, new-Keynesian advocates 
believe that real salaries are clearly procyclical, so markup rates tend to be 
countercyclical. On the contrary, more neo-classical economists assume that 
growth is mainly driven by productivity shocks, or alternatively that under non-
competitive market structures the procyclicality of productivity delivers also 
procyclical markup rates. 
 In figure 2 and 3, we present the behavior of the markup indexes for the 
Cobb-Douglas case and five additional measures. We present the corresponding 
indexes of productivity as well, since each markup measure has an implicit 
definition of marginal productivity. The diverse definitions of markup are explained 
in appendix 1, and comparisons with the benchmark case are presented in the 
section IV. 
Despite the differences in the levels, all markup and the productivity indexes 
tell a similar story. Markups and productivity start their rising trajectory by mid-
2003, until a slowdown occurs during 2009-2010. Later, both indexes rise again, 
recovering their levels before the slowdown. This possibly implies that, for most 
periods, markups could have increased due to the gains in productivity. It could 
also suggest that markups are generally procyclical. Nonetheless, most measures 
of markups end up with accumulated growth rates that exceed the accumulated 
variations in productivity. This last observation provides some room for presuming 
that there are other non-cyclical factors that might have push markups rates 
upwards.  
One important factor that could have allowed rising markups is the 
implementation of the exchange rate control in 2003. As suggested in the 
introduction, the administrative apparatus of the control inevitably ends up 
discretionally picking the receivers of massive subventions through a system of 
import licenses. Due to the premium that usually arises in the non-official exchange 
rate market, discretional subventions tend to drive non-receiving firms out of the 
market, endowing receiving firms with more monopoly power. This implies that as 
the control becomes more restrictive -and the exchange rate premium sores-, the 
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degree of competitiveness among domestic firms is reduced and actual changes in 
market structures take place.   
Figure 2. Markup indexes for different definitions 
 
Figure 3. Productivity indexes for different definitions 
 
Measure 1: Cobb-Douglas production function; Measure 2: CES production function; Measure 3: 
technology - adjusted CES production function; Measure 4: GGL generalization of CES production 
function; Measure 5: variable capital-adjusted GGL generalization of CES production function; 
Measure 6: overhead labor/variable wage-adjusted CES production function 
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III. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR OF THE MARKUP: ECONOMETRIC SETTING 
 
 As previously stressed, the objective of this paper is to disentangle the 
effects of aggregate fluctuations from the effects of exogenous markup shocks on 
the markup itself and on the rest of the economy. We focus on the markup for the 
non-oil economy. Econometrically, we consider an SVAR with six endogenous 
quarterly variables: the level of non-oil GDP, the consumer price index (CPI), the 
total quarterly hours worked, an index of the nominal wage per worker, a 
productivity index, and a markup index. All variables are considered in logarithmic 
fourth-differences, so they can be interpreted as annual growth rates. The sample 
runs from the last quarter of 1998 through the last quarter of 2013.  
 Theoretically, we divide these variables in two groups: the aggregate goods 
market (real activity growth and inflation), and the sectoral variables (total hours, 
nominal wage, productivity and markup rates).   At the aggregate level, we identify 
two shocks that explain the fluctuations in the goods market: a supply and a 
demand shock. While both expansionary supply and demand shocks increase real 
activity, they have the opposite effects on inflation. At a sectoral level, we focus our 
attention on the identification of two additional markup shocks: an inflationary 
markup shock - that allows firms to pass a higher markup through consumer 
prices-, and a non-inflationary markup shock - that allows for a higher markup by 
reducing the rate of growth of nominal wages. Because these two markup shocks 
clearly imply a redistribution of wealth between firms, consumers and workers, we 
call them the distributional markup shocks. To our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to empirically measure these distributional shocks in a formal econometric 
setup. In the literature, the closest theoretical references to these shocks are 
related to the structuralist views of inflation, surveyed in Vera (2013), or to models 
such as Sarantis (1991) where workers and capitalist engage in a distributional 
conflict over income that impacts wage inflation.  
 The importance of these distributional markup shocks is that they allow for 
exogenous variations in the markup (not associated with the business cycle) that 
potentially might represent an important source of fluctuations in real activity or 
inflation.   Additionally, these two shocks address two potential channels of markup 
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generation that might emerge in imperfectly-competitive markets or from 
bargaining in imperfect information settings. In the inflationary markup shock, the 
existence of non-competitive markets for the provision of final goods allows firms to 
cause inflationary surprises that reduce consumers’ access to goods. In the non-
inflationary markup shock, we can imagine a direct bargaining between firms (or 
the government) and workers, where firms (or the government) are capable to 
affect the trajectory of nominal salaries, by not committing to a pre-negotiated 
arrangement. Despite the strategic and dynamic considerations that could arise, 
these two channels could be analyzed from the distributional point of view to 
understand their welfare implications. However, we are not going to explore this 
route in this paper. Instead, we will limit our scope to test the existence of these 
channels of markup generation and understand their empirical relevance.  
 
a. SVAR SPECIFICATION 
 
Endogeneity between aggregate and sectoral variables can be represented 
with an SVAR (q) model, as follows: 
ttqtqtt uZZZ ++++= −−
− 
11
1
      (3) 
where tZ  is the column vector of N=6 endogenous variables, 
  ',,,,,
` ttttttt mkpprdnwhrsPyZ = , where ty  and tP , refer to real activity 
growth and the inflation rate, while thrs , tnw , tprd , tmkp  are the growth rates in 
total hours, nominal wage per worker, productivity and markup respectively. 
Additionally,  is a weakly exogenous variable that captures the growth rate of the 
value of imported intermediate goods.8 Total hours are computed using information 
on weekly hours worked reported in household surveys.  
 
8  The decision to control for the effect of intermediate goods in the system follows from the 
presumption that quantities of intermediate goods can affect productivity. As Gopinath and Neiman 
(2014) and Basu (1995) suggest, the existence of non-competitive goods markets for (imported) 
intermediate goods can translate into productivity gains, when the prices of these goods fall. These 
gains take place mostly because of the occurrence of efficiency gains.  
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 The vector tu  represents the structural error vector, which is normally 
distributed with an identity covariance matrix. Matrices  ,,  contain the 
structural VAR parameters. This SVAR(q) can be rewritten as a reduced-form 
VAR(1): 
tttt eCZZ ++= −1        (4) 
where te  is the reduced-form error vector, which is distributed normal with 
covariance matrix   and satisfies tt ue =  . We achieve identification of 
structural shocks by using sign restrictions on impulse-responses. Identification 
begins with any orthogonal decomposition V that rewrites   as  'VV= , and 
implies that orthogonal errors ( ) are a linear combination of reduced-form errors: 
tt eV
1−= .  
 Because structural shocks are strictly identified by their expected effects on 
economic variables, orthogonal errors may not necessarily qualify as such. 
Therefore, the way sign restriction identification works is by combining orthogonal 
errors in such a way that the resulting structural (also orthogonal) errors have the 
properties imposed by the researcher. Structural shocks are related to orthogonal 
errors through a matrix Q . According to Rubio-Ramírez, Waggoner, and Zha 
(2010), we can always find a rotation matrix Q that satisfies == QQQQ ''  and 
preserves ''VQQV= . In this case, impulse-responses to structural shocks 
at horizon (h) are given by the following expression:  
( ) QVhIR h 1−=
       (5) 
 Equation (4) also implies that structural errors (u) are related to orthogonal 
errors   as well: tt uQ= , and tt uVQe = .  
 Generally speaking, sign restriction identification consists of finding several 
sets of structural parameters that satisfy restrictions imposed on impulse-
responses of several variables. Operationally, sign restriction identification also 
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consists of finding several rotation matrices Q that satisfy the restrictions imposed 
on impulse-responses of variables (given by equation 4). Since each potential draw 
of Q generates a single impulse-response and represents a set of structural 
parameters, we keep only those Qs satisfying restrictions. We can generate an 
arbitrary number of Q’s (or impulse-responses) satisfying restrictions. The way to 
summarize these different impulse-responses is by computing their empirical 
percentiles, such as the median, the 16th and the 84th percentiles typically shown in 
this type of identification. However, because we do not want these percentiles to 
change with the number of simulations, we need to consider a sufficiently large 
number of Q matrices that satisfy restrictions, but do not change results when 
adding additional draws. Once percentiles are computed, the usual interpretation of 
impulse-responses applies: significant impulse-responses do not contain zero 
within their bands.    
 Besides the implementation of sign restrictions to identify structural shocks, 
we further impose some zero restrictions in impulse-responses at h=1. These zero 
restrictions further distinguish aggregate from sectoral shocks by requiring that 
aggregate (supply and real demand) shocks only use information from the goods 
market. Likewise, sectoral shocks are born only from the combination of 
information contained in sectoral variables. These zero restrictions are obtained by 
using a block diagonal structure for Q.  In particular, we set 





=
2
1
0
0
Q
Q
Q , where 
1
Q  and  
2
Q   are non-zero matrices that preserve   ='
11
QQ   and ='
22
QQ  . For our 
six variables SVAR, Q1 has dimension 2x2, while Q2 has dimensions 4x4 (it 
combines information from all sectoral variables). Aggregate shocks are defined 
through
1
Q , while sectoral (markup) shocks are defined through
2
Q . Impulse-
responses at h=1 imply that aggregate shocks contemporaneously affect all 
variables in the system, while markup shocks can only affect aggregate variables 
with a lag of one quarter. 
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b. IDENTIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL SHOCKS 
 
 For aggregate supply and demand shocks, we follow the simplest 
definitions: a positive aggregate supply shock leads to growth in real activity and a 
reduction in inflation, while a positive demand shock generates a joint boost in real 
activity and inflation. 
 Distributional markup shocks are defined in such a way that an increase in 
the markup is either explained by a rise in inflation or by a reduction in the growth 
rate of nominal salaries. Restrictions are imposed for two consecutive quarters to 
capture shocks whose effects are observed for at least two quarters. 
Notice that the markup shock sustained by the reduction in the nominal 
wage growth rate is called non-inflationary because by definition, does not affect 
inflation. However, whether this shock might end up affecting inflation, it is an 
empirical matter. Methodologically, the definitions of shocks implemented tend to 
be as agnostic as possible in the words of  Uhlig (2005). 
 
Table 1. Restrictions imposed on structural impulse-responses 
Structural shocks Restricted variables  
Expansionary supply y >0                   P <0 
Expansionary demand y >0                   P >0 
Inflationary markup mkp >0              P >0 
Non-inflationary markup  mkp >0              nw<0 
   
 
c. INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS FOR THE BECHMARK CASE 
 
 To test more accurately the impact of structural shocks on the benchmark 
case (markup measure 1), we present the accumulated impulse-responses for the 
SVAR variables to all four shocks: aggregate supply, aggregate demand and two 
distributional markup shocks (figures 4 to 7). We also present the accumulated 
variance decompositions of variables in table 2. 
In figure 4, we observe that an expansionary aggregate supply shock 
generates an increase in the total markup by enabling an important increase in 
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labor productivity and consecuently, a reduction in marginal costs. Real activity is 
also driven by a slight increase in the number of hours worked, which is consitent 
with a rise in both the number of occupied workers and the number of hours 
worked per week. In the presence of  demand shocks (figure 5), the economy also 
seems to exhibit an increase in labor productivity that allows for a growing markup 
rate. In this case however, the growth in the markup reverses as soon as the 
increase in salaries (unitary labor cost) starts increasing marginal costs. 
Since the increase of productivity for the demand shock is also significant, a 
subsidiary discussion from these two results is about what actually drives labor 
productivity. One way to rationalize productivity gains without a clear origin is to 
suppose the existence of labor hoarding. Under this this type of rigidity, firms hire a 
fixed number of workers, but a fraction of them only produces when the objective 
conditions of the economy change and firms require so. Considering how strict the 
employment protection regulation is in Venezuela since 2002, swifts increments in 
productivity could arise if firms facing a growing demand would use all their 
workers to produce more. This would occur without observing formal changes in 
the number of occupied workers or total hours worked.  
Another -more intricate- possibility is that the positive external (oil price) 
conditions for most of the period and the discretional allocation of subventions 
trough the control would have boosted labor productivity further. In this hypothesis, 
the greater access by selected firms to cheap imported intermediate goods would 
have worked as reductions in unitary costs of imported inputs that spreaded to the 
rest of the economy in the form of gains in total factor productivity. As Gopinath 
and Neiman (2014) suggest, this mechanism would be triggered, not necessarily 
by a change in the quantities of aggregate intermediate imports, but by an increase 
in the varieties of imported inputs by some firms, when facing reductions in the 
price of imports. This mechanism takes place because the monopoly power of 
importing firms transform their efficiency gains in lower prices of inputs that spread 
to the rest of the economy. In Venezuela, these efficiency gains would likely be 
artificially induced by the control. However, to test this type of transmission 
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mechanism, we would need disaggregated data for imports -by firms and products-  
and estimations of deep production parameters.    
In figures 6 and 7, we observe that exogenous increases in the markup tend 
to have a temporary effect on the level of the markup, and that they occur at the 
expense of nominal variables, such as the inflation rate or the growth rate in 
nominal salaries. Nonetheless, none of these shocks seems to statistically affect 
the real performance of the economy in terms of GDP growth or productivity. While 
the inflationary markup shock affects inflation by definition, the data supports that 
this effect is indeed permanent, i.e. the accumulated response of inflation does not 
return to zero.   For the non-inflationary markup, the data supports that this shock 
does not actually affect the inflation rate. A further implication of this last result is 
that variations in nominal wages are not probably related to changes in the inflation 
rate. 
To have a better idea of the effects of shocks on variables, we resort to the 
variance decomposition (table 2). In table 2, we can observe that supply and 
demand shocks account for all the variations in output and productivity, and most 
of the variability of inflation. Only the inflationary markup shock attains to explain 
up to a 14% of the inflation rate at a four-year horizon. This contribution, although 
non-negligible, is proportionally smaller than the contribution provided by supply 
and demand shocks. This decomposition also shows, that supply shocks explain 
most of the output performance at all horizons. Demand shocks only explain up to  
40% of inflation fluctuations. These results for Venezuela are consistent with 
evidence on six other Latin American economies, in which supply shocks also 
explain a great deal of output and inflation fluctuations, as reported in Pagliacci 
(2017). 
Nominal wages and hours worked are partly explained by the distributional 
markup shocks, but mostly for the short run. In terms of the markup itself, 
distributional shocks describe up to 37% of its fluctuations, both at the impact of 
shocks and at a four-year horizon. This implies that a subtancial part of the markup 
has its explanations in factors not associated with the business cycle dynamics. 
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Figure 4. Accumulated responses to an aggregate supply shock 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Accumulated responses to an aggregate demand shock 
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Figure 6. Accumulated responses to an inflationary markup shock 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Accumulated responses to a non-inflationary markup shock 
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Table 2. Variance decomposition of variables to shocks 
quarters 
Supply 
shock 
Demand 
shock 
Inflationary  
markup shock 
Non-inflationary  
markup shock 
Real activity 
1 52% 48% 0% 0% 
8 62% 37% 0% 1% 
16 70% 29% 0% 1% 
Inflation 
1 63% 37% 0% 0% 
8 48% 41% 11% 0% 
16 46% 40% 14% 1% 
Total hours 
1 34% 12% 53% 0% 
8 44% 40% 0% 16% 
16 74% 9% 3% 14% 
Nominal Wage 
1 1% 10% 32% 57% 
8 27% 64% 1% 8% 
16 35% 58% 5% 2% 
Productivity 
1 49% 50% 0% 0% 
8 33% 65% 0% 1% 
16 19% 79% 1% 1% 
Markup 
1 10% 53% 16% 21% 
8 27% 8% 21% 44% 
16 63% 1% 4% 32% 
  
Given the availability of data and the econometric setting selected for this 
analysis, we cannot provide an exhaustive list of all the factors that could cause 
exogenous markup movements. Merely, we can provide two potential narratives for 
the markup appropriation that are not rejected by the data.  
 In one narrative, because of the importance of the non-inflationary markup 
shock for explaining the markup at a two-year horizon, markups must be related to 
the trajectory of nominal salaries. On the one hand, since nominal salaries can be 
affected by the government decisions on minimun wages, it is possible that 
exogeneous markup movements are associated with these discretionary decisions. 
On the other hand, as long as average salaries depart from minimum wages, wage 
policies from firms might also affect the behavior of nominal salaries and markups. 
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In appendix 2, we test the relative importance of minimun wage discretionary 
changes on average wages. From this partial evidence, we find that the trajectory 
of nominal wages seems to depend more on firms’ decisions than on minimum 
wage decisions. This might imply that the presumed monopoly power gained by 
firms in goods markets might also translate into monopsony power for bargaining 
nominal wages. This monopsony power is what allows a redistribution of wealth 
from workers to firms. 
 In a second narrative, because temporary increments in the markup 
translate into permanent higher inflation, final goods markets are likely to be highly 
non-competitive. That is, firms hold enough monopoly power to pass margin 
increases through consumer prices. In this process, there must also be some 
institutional factors that help explain market structures. For instance, the enormous 
oil windfall experienced up to 2008 and the exchange rate control could be two 
important elements affectting sectoral market structures and competitiveness. Also, 
the reduction of the number of running firms -after the 2003 general strike- is an 
additional element to be considered.9 However, testing these hypotheses 
appropiately would require theoretical models that allow us to perform 
counterfactual exercises on the conections between external conditions and 
market structures.  
 
 
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS AND SECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 As previously shown in figures 2 and 3, the definition of markup and 
productivity implemented could change the story told by the empirical model. In this 
section, we re-estimate the model for each of the definitions of markup and 
productivity available, while maintaining the rest of the variables in the system. 
Then we compute impulse-responses and compare them to the benchmark case in 
figures 8. The benchmark case corresponds to measure 1. 
 
9 In December 2003, accumulated political conflicts during 2002 led to a one-month general strike, 
in which the state oil company and most of the private sector ceased their production. After the 
resolution of the strike, many businesses shut down, especially in the trade and manufacturing 
sectors.  
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 Figure 8. Accumulated responses of different measures to shocks 
  
  
  
  
Measure 1: Cobb-Douglas production function; Measure 2: CES production function; Measure 3: technology - adjusted CES 
production function; Measure 4: GGL generalization of CES production function; Measure 5: variable capital-adjusted GGL 
generalization of CES production function; Measure 6: overhead labor/variable wage-adjusted CES production function 
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Figure 8 shows that the uncertainty over the markup and producitivity 
measures also translate into uncertainty in the magnitude of impulse-responses. In 
most cases, the Coob-Douglas responses could stand for median impulse-
responses. Nonetheless, the different definitions of markup and productivity do not 
qualitatively alter the direction of responses for these variables to aggregate supply 
and demand shocks (first two rows of figure 8). In fact, markup and productivity 
continue being procyclical to expansionary aggregate shocks.   
 On the other hand, when addressing exogenous markup shocks, different 
markup measures deliver different implications for the behavior of productivity. For 
instance, exogenous shocks (inflationary and non-inflationary) could either not 
affect or increase labor productivity, depending on the definition of markup used 
(last two rows of figure 8). This opens the possibility that exogenous increments in 
the markup might generate positive temporary real effects in the economy. That is, 
higher markup rates might lead firms to produce more temporarily. However this 
claim depends on how reliable the measures of productivity are.    
Another important consideration for evaluating the robustness of the 
empirical results is to understand whether conclusions hold for sectoral measures 
of the markup. For this purpose, we compute the markup for the manufacturing and 
trade sector respectively. As shown in figure 9, both sectoral markups have 
increased more importantly than the general non-oil markup .Differently than 
calculations with annual data, these indexes suggest that greatest markup gains 
have occurred in the trade sector. 
We also compute the responses of these sectoral measures to aggregate 
supply and demand shocks (figure 10). In figure 10, although markups tend to 
increase only in the margin for expansionary supply shocks (first row), both 
measures tend to decrease for expansionary demand shocks, as new-keynesian 
advocates would predict (second row). In the specific case of the trade markup, an 
expansionary demand shock temporarily increases it, but as production expands, 
the markup falls. These results might also suggest that these sectors tend to face 
more increasing marginal costs than other sectors in the economy. 
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Figure 9. Sectoral markup indexes 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Responses of sectoral markups to expansionary aggregate shocks 
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Another implication of the impulse-responses is that important growths in these 
sectoral markups might have taken place after the occurrence of contractionary 
demand shocks. Therefore, historical increases in manufacturing and trade 
markups can be related to expansionary supply shocks, to contractionary demand 
shocks and to exogenous markup increments. According to the variance 
decomposition of these two exercises, exogenous markup shocks tend to explain a 
great deal of markup fluctuations, especially for the first year (up to 90% of 
fluctuations in both sectors). After four years, demand and supply shocks rather 
explain most of fluctuactions in markups (80% and 60% for the manufacturing and 
the trade sector respectively). This again implies that, part of these exogeneous 
markup surges could relate to factors that have affected  the sectoral allocation of 
resources and the degree of competion in markets, such as the oil windfall, the 
exchange rate control, and the 2003 general strike.  
 
 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
 
 The discussion about the markup in most of the academic literature refers to 
the direction of markup responses to the business cycle.  This occurs because, in 
most theoretical models, the markup is regarded as an endogenous variable that 
reflects the interaction between total factor productivity and costs, given that more 
structural factors, such as the degree of price stickiness and the level of 
competition among firms, remain constant.  
 In emerging small economies such as the Venezuelan, some external 
conditions and economic policy decisions have created the propitious conditions 
for the emergence of markup changes that are not related to the business cycle 
dynamics. We call these exogenous changes distributional markup shocks 
because they necessarily imply redistribution of wealth among consumers, 
producer and workers. Although we do not focus on the detailed description or 
implications of these distributional processes, we provide an econometric strategy 
for the identification of these shocks. In other words, we provide and test two 
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potential channels of markup appropriation that suggest the existence of 
distributional processes. 
 Econometric results show that for the Venezuelan economy, a substantial 
part of the markup (around a 40%) is explained by these distributional shocks. 
These results lead us to assert that firms can undertake permanent exogenous 
markup increases by affecting the behavior of average wages or by passing 
markups through inflation. These two types of behavior can only occur in 
environments of imperfect competition for the markets of final goods and factors. 
The context of growing markup rates since 1983, and more markedly since 2003, 
has also led us to believe that these results are highly associated with a 
combination of prolonged exchange rate controls and the general 
deindustrialization process that started in the nineties -and deepened during the 
last three lustres. 
 We also find that for the part of the markup related to cyclical fluctuations, 
the non-oil markup is procyclical for both expansionary supply and demand shocks. 
Overall, the increase in the markup is explained by the productivity gains arising 
during these shocks. These productivity gains could also be explained by the 
existence of non-competitive markets for the imports of intermediate goods or by 
rigidities in the labor market, such as labor hoarding. Nonetheless, a further 
investigation about the sources of these productivity gains would contribute to 
better understanding the endogenous response of the markup to the business 
cycle. At the sectoral level -in the manufacturing and trade sectors-, the markup 
seems to be countercyclical for demand shocks. In these cases, initial increases in 
markups are eventually wiped out by the rise of real wages.  
 The policy implications of our results seem also significant. An important 
part of the markup growth in the recent Venezuelan history is potentially attributed 
to a set of policies choices that have worsened market structures and 
competitiveness. This interpretation calls for a revision of these policies and for 
understanding that lower markup margins require assertive public policies that aim 
at changing market structures and competitiveness in the right direction.  
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Appendix 1. Calculations of different markup measures 
 
Measure 1: Cobb-Douglas production function. Under the assumption that the 
production function takes is Cobb-Douglas, we can write:  𝑌 = 𝑔(𝐾)(𝐻)𝛼          (6) 
where 𝐾 is the capital stock, 𝐻 the number of hours worked (Bils, 1987). The 
function 𝑔 is a positive increasing function and 𝛼 > 0. In this case, markup growth 
rate is given by:  ?̇? = −𝑠ℎ𝐿̇ ≞ 𝑦?̇? − 𝑟?̇?        (7) 
 
Measure 2: CES production function. One characteristic of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function is that it is isoelastic in terms of the labor and capital 
substitution. However, empirical results have shown that capital and labor are less 
substitutable in the short-run than in the long run (Basu, 1995; Basu & Fernald, 
1997). When this happens, elasticity of output with respect to labor input is smaller 
than one. One way to introduce this element in our calculations is to assume a 
CES production function, that is: 𝑌 = [𝛼(𝐻)𝜎−1𝜎 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾)𝜎−1𝜎 ] 𝜎𝜎−1       (8) 
where 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. In this case, the 
markup growth rate is: 
 μ̇ = −𝑠ℎ̇𝐿+ 1−σσ (YH)̇ ≞ (𝑦?̇? + 𝑦𝐻𝑊̇ ) − 𝑟?̇?      (9) 
where we assume that the elasticity of substitution 𝜎 = 0.5 and define 𝑦𝐻𝑊̇ = (𝑌𝐻)̇  
as the change in productivity per hour worked (hourly productivity). Therefore, 
variations in marginal productivity equates the change in average product per 
worker plus the change in hourly productivity. 
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Measure 3: technology-adjusted CES production function. For this case, we 
estimate the technological shock from an SVAR in two variables: variations of 
hourly productivity (𝑦𝐻𝑊̇ ) and variations in total hours (ℎ𝑟𝑠̇ ). As in Galí (1999), 
identification of the technological shock is achieved using long run restrictions: a 
technological shock has a long run impact on hourly productivity. Once identified, 
we compute the historical decomposition of the technological shock on hourly 
productivity. This defines the effect of the technological shock on hourly 
productivity: ℎ𝑑(𝑍). Adjusted hourly productivity is given by:  𝑦𝐻𝑊𝑎̇ = 𝑦𝐻𝑊̇ − ℎ𝑑(𝑍) . 
The markup growth rate calculated for this case is identical to expression (9) but 
using adjusted hourly productivity instead of plain hourly productivity. 
 
 
 
Measure 4: GGL generalization of CES production function. For this case, we 
implement the CES generalization of the production function used in Gali et al. 
(2007). As the authors suggest: 
μ̇ = −𝑠ℎ̇𝐿+ 𝜃 (YK)̇ 1𝜎−1 ≞ (𝑦?̇? − 0.4 ∗ 𝑦?̇?) − 𝑟?̇?    (10) 
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where  θ = −0.4, σ = 0.5 and 𝑦?̇? = (YK)̇ . The stock of capital is obtained from the 
the annual non-residential capital constructed by Baptista (2012), which is 
transformed into a quarterly series using the statistics of quarterly investment from 
the Central Bank. 
 
Measure 5: variable capital-adjusted GGL generalization of CES production 
function. For this case, we use the same definition as in equation (10), but 
adjusting the use of capital according to a quarterly capital utilization series. This 
series is obtained from a DSGE model run at the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
 
Measure 6: overhead labor/variable wage-adjusted CES production function. 
Another source of rigidity is the presence of overhead labor. One way to model this 
assumption is that the production function is: 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, (𝐻 − ?̅?)), where 𝐹 is 
homogeneous of degree zero and ?̅? ≥ 0 represents “overhead labor”, which is 
labor hired but not directly involved in production. In this case, production exhibits 
increasing returns to scale and the mark up rate takes the following form, 
μ̇ = −𝑠ℎ̇𝐿+ 1−σσ ( YH−H̅)̇ ≞ (𝑦?̇? + 𝑦𝐻𝐻̇ ) − 𝑟?̇?𝑎    (11) 
where  𝑦𝐻𝐻̇ = ( YH−H̅)̇ , 𝜎 = 0.5 and wages are also adjusted. In particular, adjusted 
wages correspond to the fitted value of wages, once they are regressed against 
weakly hours and number of occupied workers in production. For the Venezuelan 
case, the behavior of number of workers directly occupied in production is very 
similar to the behavior of the total number of workers. Main differences of this 
measure with respect to other definitions come from the adjusted behavior of 
salaries, which intend to capture the portion of salaries varying with production (in 
order to approximate salaries to a marginal salary rate).  
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Appendix 2. Estimation of the impact of minimun wages on total wages 
The average total wage of the economy can be represented by the following 
equation: 𝑁𝑊𝑡 = 𝑀𝑆𝑡𝛽 𝑁𝑊𝑡−11−𝛽       (12)  
 
where NW is the nominal average wage of the economy and MS represents the 
minimum wage established by the government. Next, we present the linearized-
differentiated estimation of this equation. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: NW   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q1 2013Q4  
Included observations: 60 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.016907 0.016084 1.051151 0.2976 
MS 0.210688 0.049872 4.224580 0.0001 
NW(-1) 0.731527 0.070098 10.43572 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.701775    Mean dependent var 0.194158 
Adjusted R-squared 0.691311    S.D. dependent var 0.064608 
S.E. of regression 0.035896    Akaike info criterion -3.767676 
Sum squared resid 0.073446    Schwarz criterion -3.662959 
Log likelihood 116.0303    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.726716 
F-statistic 67.06556    Durbin-Watson stat 1.488043 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Wald Test:   
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic -0.696880  57  0.4887 
F-statistic  0.485642 (1, 57)  0.4887 
Chi-square  0.485642  1  0.4859 
    
    Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)=1  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    -1 + C(2) + C(3) -0.057786  0.082920 
    
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
 
Assuming a type 1 error of 5%, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sum of 
coefficients adds up to one. 
 
